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Logic may have played an important role in the genesis of cognitive science, but its
importance for this field has progressively diminished, as a consequence of many
different pressures. Some of the arguments, in arbitrary order, are as follows:
(1) Experiments with reasoning tasks, such as the famous Wason selection task (Wason
1968), show that logical form is not a determinant of reasoning
(2) Logic cannot deal with vagueness and prototypicality
(3) Logic cannot deal with uncertainty and must be replaced by probability theory,
which is after all the calculus of uncertainty
(4) What we know about the neocortex suggests that the computations executed by
the brain are very different from logical computations
(5) The computational complexity of logic is too high for logic to be a realistic model
of cognition
Logicians reading this will have already shaken their head at some of these claims;
the aim of this special issue is to provide empirical and formal counterevidence to
them, and others in a similar vein. In this introduction, we examine in greater detail
the argument 1, using it as a springboard to defend a restored central role for logic,
and more generally formal models of cognition (in a sense which we make exact later
on), in cognitive science.
We begin by discussing the selection task and its aftermath. Wason’s original task
was presented by means of a form as depicted in Fig. 1. In order to appreciate the
tremendous difficulty posed by this task, the reader—who has probably seen the task
before—should realise that this is all the information provided to the subjects. This
experiment has been replicated many times.
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Fig. 1 Wason’s selection task
Below is depicted a set of four cards, of which you can see only the exposed
face but not the hidden back. On each card, there is a number on one of its sides
and a letter on the other.
Also below there is a rule which applies only to the four cards. Your task is to
decide which if any of these four cards you must turn in order to decide if the
rule is true. Don’t turn unnecessary cards. Tick the cards you want to turn.
Rule: If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other
side.
If one formulates the rule If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even num-
ber on the other side. as an implication p → q, then the observed pattern of results
is typically given as in Table 1. Wason believed there to be only one ‘logically cor-
rect’ answer, namely p,¬q, and concluded that according to this standard, the vast
majority of reasoners are irrational. In addition, the selection task was used to argue
that most adults do not reach what Piaget (1953) considered the pinnacle of cogni-
tive development, the formal operational stage, which is basically mastery of classical
propositional logic. Not only do subjects typically fail to master the modus tollens
inference supposed to be at work here, they do not even have a workable concept of
logical form to guide their reasoning. For if Wason’s ‘abstract’ rule If there is a vowel
on one side, then there is an even number on the other side. is replaced by the ‘con-
crete’ rule if you want to drink alcohol, you have to be over 18, performance suddenly
jumps to more acceptable levels, around 75%. These two reasoning tasks–‘abstract’
and ‘concrete’—are considered to have the same logical form. So, the argument goes,
if logical form determines performance in a task, performance on these tasks must be
comparable. The data show that performance differs wildly, whence logical form is
irrelevant to reasoning. A tacit inference followed: if logic plays no role in reasoning,
why would it play a role in other domains of cognition?
We must first note that so far we have been talking about logic in the singular,
as is common in cognitive science, which proceeds mostly as if classical logic were
the only game in town. But to appreciate logic’s place in cognitive science, a broader
conception of logic is necessary. This involves acknowledging the need for many dif-
ferent logics, varying in syntax, semantics and definition of validity (Stenning and van
Lambalgen 2008). In fact, the impression that logic is useless in cognitive science is
for the most part due to the uncritical identification of logic with classical logic, or in
any case with a system of rules. In logic itself this conception was finally laid to rest
with the advent of ‘model theoretic logics’, for which see (Barwise 1985).
Table 1 Typical scores in the
selection task p p, q p,¬q p, q,¬q misc.
35% 45% 5% 7% 8%
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This need for many logics arises because at a suitably abstract level cognitive
functions, i.e. information processing tasks, can be usefully described in a logic, not
necessarily classical, and not necessarily given by a system of rules. To see why this can
be so, consider David Marr’s three levels of cognitive inquiry Marr (1982, Chap. 1):
(1) identification of the information processing task as an input–output function;1 this
competence model expresses what the information processing task considered is
supposed to do
(2) specification of an algorithm which computes that function
(3) neural implementation of the algorithm specified2
As an example of how a competence model can be specified, consider (a particular
view of) language comprehension. Here, the input consists of natural language dis-
course, and the output consists in discourse models, or more technically, ‘discourse
representation structures’ (DRS) (Kamp and Reyle 1993; Hamm et al. 2006). Both
input and output can be specified in terms of a formal language. The formal structure
of the input language is simple: concatenation of sentences. For the output we need a
language describing the various ways in which DRSs can be combined. The specific
‘competence’ aspect is given by the norm relating input and output: if the input dis-
course is true in a model A, the output DRS can be embedded in A. As regards the
second level, there are algorithms transforming natural language discourse into a cor-
responding DRS—corresponding in the sense that the competence model is satisfied.
A neural implementation does not exist yet—but see below.
To return to the competence level, observe that the norm relating input and output
can be viewed as a definition of validity of ‘arguments’ S1, . . . , Sn  K , where the Si
are sentences and K is (a sentence describing) a DRS. Thus we have all the ingredients
of a logic here: syntax, semantics, validity. But why is this a useful way of looking at
the competence level?
One useful feature of such a fully specified competence model is that it allows a
correctness proof for the algorithm of the second level. Equally importantly, in setting
up the competence model formally one may uncover assumptions which restrict its
scope unduly. An example is in order here. The formal model for discourse compre-
hension sketched earlier has as a consequence that, as the discourse grows, the set of
discourse models forms a monotonic chain. Assume that the given discourse grows
from S1, . . . , Sn to S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1, and that the semantic force of the comma is
conjunction, so that ‘S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1 is true on A’ implies ‘S1, . . . , Sn is true on
A. Let Kn be the discourse model corresponding to S1, . . . , Sn , and Kn+1 that for
S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1. Then both Kn and Kn+1 are embeddable in A, and since the uni-
verse of Kn is a subset of that of Kn+1, it follows that Kn must be a substructure of
Kn+1. Thus the sequence of discourse models is monotonic.
As soon as one realises this, one sees that the proposed competence model lacks
cognitive plausibility. Consider the simple discourse:
1 Marr calls this the ‘computational level’, but this term is infelicitous in view of what the next level does.
We prefer the term ‘competence model’ instead.
2 This tripartite scheme of explanation should be read neither bottom-up nor top-down, but as a set of
constraints; for example, the algorithm may be determined both by the competence model and by what is
known about neural computation.
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Some real estate agents are crooks. In fact all of them are.
Gricean maxims tell you that after the first sentence the discourse model verifies ‘Some
real estate agents are not crooks’, a statement that is flatly denied by the second sen-
tence. So here the progression of discourse models cannot be monotonic. While this
example is from pragmatics, the following is squarely inside semantics, and concerns
the meaning of the English progressive (Baggio and van Lambalgen 2007).
The door of the living-room was closed. Inside the radio played classical music.
The girl was writing letters [*] when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth/paper.
Behavioural data show that if the sentence ends with ‘tablecloth’, 75% of subjects
conclude that in the end a letter was written, whereas if the final word is ‘paper’, this
percentage drops to 37%. The most parsimonious explanation for this is that in the
discourse model of the discourse up to the point [*], a finished letter is introduced, so
that after seeing ‘paper’, but not after seeing ‘tablecloth’, that entity must be removed
again.3 Therefore this sequence of discourse models is non-monotonic. It is argued
in Baggio and van Lambalgen (2007), and that a fairly well-established discourse
processing principle, the ‘principle of immediacy’, which says that
every source of information that constrains the interpretation of an utterance (syn-
tax, prosody, word-level semantics, prior discourse, world knowledge, knowl-
edge about the speaker, gestures, etc.) can in principle do so immediately
[i.e. before sentence boundary], (Hagoort and van Berkum 2007)
forces a non-monotonic progression of discourse models. Again, this shows that the
earlier competence model, in particular its definition of validity, is not cognitively
plausible.
In the face of such difficulties, a common tactic in cognitive science is to drop
all reference to a competence model and be content with an algorithm instead. The
downside of this tactic is that one ends up with a bunch of specialised algorithms, and
that commonalities between tasks may disappear from view. So what has to replace the
discarded competence model? The definition of validity cannot be direct comparison
with the real world, but it may come from internal considerations on what is the ‘best’
notion of non-monotonicity from a cognitive point of view.
More generally, this example serves to illustrate that cognitively realistic formal
models are possible, and moreover, that they are needed. They provide the requi-
site level of information-theoretic description, thereby making modelling assumptions
explicit, and eventually enabling commonalities across cognitive tasks and domains
to be investigated and described. After all, the goal of cognitive science is a unified
theory of cognition. We hope that the articles in this special issue of the journal provide
suitable formal tools to move further towards this goal.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
3 There exist EEG data consistent with this view (Baggio et al. to appear).
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